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Abstract 
This  paper  provides  new  evidences  to  the  literature  of  assignment  in  the  labor  market  for  the 
Colombian case. Specifically it focuses on the existing relationship between acquired human capital 
in higher education and its congruence in the labor market.  Differing from previews studies, the 
misallocation analysis is not only based on the horizontal component and the educational mismatch, 
but it also includes the vertical mechanism (vertical mechanism is related to skills mismatch and 
horizontal mechanism is related to professional career mismatch). Another contribution is how we 
measure the abilities through an exploratory factor analysis. The data are taken from the Survey of 
Graduates of Higher Education Institutions 2014, provided by OLE.  We  employ  a  two-step 
treatment effect method proposed by Heckman (1974, 1979) and Lee (1978)), we found that generic 
abilities  raise  the  probability  of  horizontal  mismatch  and  diminish  the  probability  of  vertical 
mismatch. On the other hand, specific abilities lower the probability of both horizontal and vertical 
mismatch.  In  terms  of  wages,  we  found  evidence  that  confirmed  the  results  of  the  
assignment models  because it exists a wage penalty for the mismatched individuals (Sattinger, 
1993). 
JEL classification: C35; J24; J31 
Keywords: Horizontal and vertical mismatch; assignment theory; generic and specific skills; 
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1. Introduction 
Investment in education has been a recurrent policy to generate economic development
3
. These types 
of policies are based on the predictions of the classical theory of human capital, which arguments that 
the growth in educational levels produces a direct rise in individual productivity (Mincer, 1958). In 
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 The World Conference on Education for All concluded that education is the safer and healthier path to reach a 
prosperous social, economic and cultural world. 
 
(OECD, 2013) proposed investing in education as a main strategy to improve both economic growth and 
efficiency of the distribution of national income. 
 
this model, the output per worker depends only of the individual´s quantity of human capital offered, 
and job characteristics don´t have any effect in the production. The latter suggests that increases in 
years of education should generate a direct impact in productivity, independent of the type of 
education and its relevance to the productive sector. 
The growing interest in human capital has generated a significant increase in the investment in 
education which has led to greater access to education in almost all developing countries. For 
instance, according to World Bank data, in Latin America and the Caribbean the average rate of 
enrollment in primary and secondary school moved approximately from 69% in 1970 to 96% in 
2013. Meanwhile, the percentage of enrollment to tertiary education rose from 7% to 60% in the 
same period. 
Educational explosion comes with a body of literature that seeks to validate the efficacy of this 
approach. Efforts such those conducted by (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994) and (Krueger & Lindahl, 
2001) have concluded that there is not a positive relationship between education and worker 
productivity. For example, the percentage of enrollment in tertiary education in Colombia changed 
from 14% in 1990 to 48% in 2013, while the productivity index grew only 23% in the same period, 
far below the human capital investment. 
Some studies have tried to identify the possible reasons why human capital investment does not 
directly increase individual productivity. (Easterly, 2002) argues that investment in education by 
itself is not enough; the incentives generated by the government through public policy should be aim 
towards congruence, creating educated people having both the required skills by the productive sector 
and the available technology to exploit those abilities. A better skills supply enhance workers’ 
productivity, mainly because these workers would be performing tasks in which they have a 
comparative advantage, which should translate into a GDP growth (Eijs and Heijke, 2000). 
According to this, the educational policy should take into account the interaction between supply and 
demand of human capital, understanding how the match is generated between worker´s education and 
his or her job in the labor market. An appropriate match leads to an efficient use of the available 
resources, while a worker-job mismatch produces problems of productivity, unemployment and 
underemployment within the group with higher qualifications (Brown et al., 2011). 
The accuracy of matching in the labor market has attracted the attention of researchers for some time. 
The main reason for this growing interest is the increasing acknowledgment of the influence of this 
variable in several labor market outcomes such as labor turnover, job satisfaction and wages (Badillo-
Amador, García-Sánchez, & Vila, 2005). This interest has been focused mainly in the relationship 
with wages, with important theoretical background advances, which established the effects of 
worker-job mismatch on this outcome. Importantly, the interpretation of empirical results strongly 
depends on which theory is adopted for the researcher, and the focus and objective of the study 
realized. 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of congruence of higher education in the individual 
productivity, therefore in the individual´s earnings. The approach is based on the determinants of the 
allocation process in the labor market, defining congruence as the effect of area of education and 
acquiring skills on the chances of achieving an appropriate match, using an individual based 
approach. For this purpose, three important aspects will be taken into account: first, the theory under 
which the results are going to be considered; second, the types of mismatch and which of these will 
be used in the empirical analysis; and third, which forms of human capital and skills will be used as 
determinants of the assignment process and wage equation. 
This article contributes to the literature of assignment in the labor market, specifically it is interested 
in the existing relationship between acquired human capital in higher education and its pertinence in 
the labor market. Differing from previews studies, the misallocation analysis is not only based on the 
horizontal component and the educational mismatch, but it also includes the vertical component 
(measuring the assignment skill process) and its interaction with the mentioned mechanisms. Another 
contribution is the way we used for quantifying the abilities in the model through exploratory factor 
analysis. The data are taken from the Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions 2014 
(Encuesta de Seguimiento a Graduados 2014 de Instituciones de Educación Superior) provided by the 
Labor Observatory for Education in Colombia (OLE, for its acronym in Spanish). Through the two-
step treatment effect method we found that interpersonal competencies related to generic abilities, 
raise the probability of horizontal mismatch and diminish the probability of vertical mismatch. On the 
other hand, specific competencies related to technical abilities lower the probability of both 
horizontal and vertical mismatch. Regarding wages, it is confirmed the results of the assignment 
models because it exists a wage penalty for the mismatched individuals. 
The remaining of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 makes a literature review regarding wage 
determinants and their relationship with worker-job mismatch. Section 3 discusses the types of 
mismatch, the theories in which they can be framed and the determinants of the assignment process. 
Section 4 presents the data used. The empirical model is presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 
contains the conclusion, discussion and possible further research. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives 
Economists have developed different models in an attempt to explain the behavior of wages, the 
differences between individual’s incomes, and the differences in wage’s growth in the agents’ life-
cycle. A part of the heterogeneity in individuals’ wages is explained by the observed and unobserved 
characteristics of workers and firms, this is where the worker-job matching appears. This paper is 
going to describe the human capital, search and matching, assignment and heterogeneous skills 
theory and their relationship with assignment process. 
2.1. Human capital theory 
This line of economic thought was developed by Becker (1975); Mincer (1958, 1974) and Porat 
(1967) who assume a competitive and non-friction economy where workers receive a rental rate for 
its human capital stock which is equal among all firms. The model is based in homogeneous 
individuals with freedom to choose their educational level and occupations. The assumption of 
competitive economy implies that the present value of income life-cycle in different options should 
be the same; otherwise all individuals would take the option with the highest payout. The major 
constraint that emerges is that individual productivity is the same among all occupations (Rubinstein 
& Weiss, 2006).  
According to the tradition of human capital theory (Almond & Currie, 2011) wages are determined 
solely by individual characteristics, such as education and experience level; theoretically, these 
features are independent to the demand. In a simple way the wage function assume equilibrium where 
all rental rates are equal through the market, which implies that the assignment process of workers to 
jobs would be irrelevant to the wages. 
Based on human capital theory, educational mismatch cannot exist if the labor market is efficient; 
economists who support this theory propose two hypotheses to explain the apparent existence of 
suboptimal matches. The human capital compensation hypothesis says that the apparent mismatch is 
largely due to measurement errors that come from the unobservable heterogeneity, therefore when 
relevant abilities are taken into account; wage is independent of job characteristics. Career mobility 
hypothesis arguments that mismatch exist but only in the short run and disappear with the years of 
experience and training.  Korpi & Tåhlin (2009) and  the  meta  analysis  conducted  by Harmon & 
Walker (2003) tested  and  did  not  support  neither  of  these  two  hypotheses;  on  the contrary they 
showed consistency in their results when they allowed for mismatch variables in the specifications. 
Because conclusions in human capital model are based on restrictive assumptions, other theories have 
emerged to explain the individual income. 
2.2. Search and matching models 
The theory developed by (Burdett, 1978; McCall, 1970; D. T. Mortensen & Pissarides, 1999; D. 
Mortensen, 1970) address the problem of asymmetric information and market rigidities in the labor 
market. In this limited information model the rate of return is heterogeneous among individuals with 
different levels of human capital. That is, firms paying low rental rate can coexist whit high-payment 
counterparts for employees with the same level of human capital. 
In this model wage’s growth is determined by the worker’s option to accept or reject job offers, 
therefore wage’s growth is marginally decreasing in time because more experience leads to more 
valuable works and higher occupational level. The latter explains the decreases in the likelihood to 
find better job matches (D. T. Mortensen & Pissarides, 1999). The search model explains how 
heterogeneous workers are being assigned to jobs with different characteristics suggesting a valuable 
implication: the better the match the higher their earnings. It is worth noting that this model does not 
involve explicitly interactions between demand and supply in the labor market, agents receive job 
offers randomly.  
2.3. Assignment and heterogeneous skills theory 
When supply and demand characteristics are taken into account to determine individual wages, 
assignment (Sattinger, 1993) and heterogeneous skills (Green & McIntosh, 2007) models come up. 
Both assignment theory and heterogeneous skills, postulate human capital investment and required 
level of education and skills for a job as main determinants of income. These models are based on the 
comparative advantage that emerges when two workers’ outcomes are not the same in the same job 
task (Roy, 1951). If there were no comparative advantage, the election of human capital level by the 
firm would be completely arbitrary and the problem of assignment would disappear.  
Following (Di Pietro & Urwin, 2003), the difference between the two theories lie on the 
interpretation of educational mismatch (under and overeducation) and skills mismatch (under and 
overcompetent). Assignment (Sattinger, 1993) theory establishes a really close relationship between 
these two concepts: employees that occupy positions with job requirements differing from his 
educational background –educational mismatch– is a consequence of the inappropriate match 
between their skills and the abilities needed to fulfill the job’s necessities –skills mismatch–. 
Therefore, workers with educational and skills mismatch are less productive than their counterparts 
that work in the appropriate position. 
On the other hand heterogeneous skills theory postulate a weaker relationship between educational 
and skills mismatch than the assignment theory. This model is based on the fact that even among 
individuals with the same educational background, the distribution of skills and knowledge is 
dissimilar due to the individual heterogeneity. Thus, it is possible to find workers apparently 
overeducated, because they are in the lowest tail of the skills distribution conditioned to individuals 
with similar qualifications, in terms of skills they may match better. 
The differences between assignment and heterogeneous skills theories is relevant to conduct 
empirical evaluations, because of the difference in the construction of the educational mismatch and 
skills mismatch variables, also the effect of these variables on the labor market outcomes may differ 
too. Nevertheless, formalization and predictions of the two theories is the same. Then, we are going 
to specify the formal model and its main predictions according to the tradition of assignment models 
(Allen & Van Der Velden, 2001; Hartog, 1981, 1986a, 1986b, 2000; Roy, 1950, 1951; Sattinger & 
Hartog, 2013; Sattinger, 1975, 1993; Teulings, 1995; Willis & Rosen, 1979). These are going to serve 
as a basis for the development of this article. Empirically, after presentation of the data we are going 
to explain the creation process of the different variables to both types of mismatch and we will test if 
educational and skills mismatch are different process to the Colombian case. 
2.3.1. Assignment model 
We follow the theoretical model posed by (Hartog, 1986a) that is grounded on the model proposed by 
(Tinbergen, 1956) and (Sattinger, 1979) that focuses in a process of selection by workers and firms. 
First, firms are seeking for individuals with the indicate stock of human capital to each job that is 
characterized by labor requirements. For simplicity only one variable    is important to determine the 
labor requirements in a particular job  . In the short run firm´s characteristics are fixed and finding 
the correct worker can be difficult, thus the company may need to hire a worker whose skills differ 
from   . 
Then, in the short run the problem is reduced to match the best worker to a given job. The capacity of 
the workers (we can include here skills and level of school) is defined as  , firms face a wage in 
function of labor requirement ( ) and type of worker ( ), where        .  Firms are maximizing 
profits when marginal product and marginal wage cost are equal:            ⁄           ⁄ . 
Where         indicates the marginal productivity of a worker   in a given job   .  
In the second part of the model, workers have to choose a job given the level of capability   (in the 
short run capability levels are assumed as fixed). The assumption is that the worker decides on type 
of job, having into account the tradeoff between effort ( ) and earnings ( ). The individual’s utility 
function is specified as           which captures the idea that some jobs ( ) can be easier than 
others depending on the individual skills ( ). The worker maximize his or her utility when marginal 
change in effort is identical to the marginal increase in earnings, it is     ⁄       ⁄     ⁄⁄ . 
In terms of the empirical approach, it is important to note that employees also perform a 
maximization to choose the type of job they want, this optimization depends on the individual’s 
abilities. Therefore type of labor is an endogenous variable and depends on observed and unobserved 
characteristics, this may produces two problems: selection bias because workers select themselves to 
the job they are going to apply; and double causality because workers optimize considering wage and 
at the same time wage is a function of the type of job and the type of worker. 
The economy consists therefore in a numerous population of workers, for whom there is a 
distribution function of abilities ( ) and a sufficiently large number of firms with distribution 
function of labor requirements ( ). In this hypothetical world, companies look for the best worker 
given   and workers do the same thing for the companies given  . There is a wage function that 
guarantees the market equilibrium with the following theoretical implications: workers with the same 
level of skills ( ) observed in different jobs are going to have different salaries in function of the job 
characteristics ( ), the most suitable individuals for every job will receive a wage compensation.  The 
slope with respect to  , represent the skills marginal productivity, to jobs with the same 
characteristics ( ) are observed workers with different levels of abilities; the wage difference will 
reflect the differences in productivity. 
 
3. Determinants of the assignment model and types of mismatch 
From the assignment model we can detach the fact that individuals with a set of heterogeneous 
abilities are looking for positioning themselves in the best job given their characteristics. Individuals’ 
competencies may have natural divisions, for instance, one job may seek a worker with knowledge in 
a specific discipline or field and at the same time, this individual should have ability to learn or solve 
generic problems. Furthermore employers do not only look at those kinds of skills, employees may 
have unobserved characteristics that help them to perform better in achieving employment like 
persistence or motivation. Then, skills can be separated into following dimensions: cognitive and 
noncognitive (Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006) and within cognitive skills there is a sub set of 
generic and vocational skills (Heijke, Meng, & Ris, 2003).  
Therefore we assume that the set of individual characteristics at time of graduation is a combination 
of noncognitive (   ), cognitive (   ), generic (  ), and vocational (  ) abilities, then the human 
capital of an individual ( ) can be represented by                     . This paper will 
emphasize on the effect of these abilities on the assignment process, which reflects the pertinence of 
education, and at the same time we will measure the effect of this pertinence and different types of 
abilities on salaries. 
To understand the assignment process we have to keep in mind the existence of two types of 
adjustment dimensions. On one side, the horizontal dimension involves the possibility that an 
individual is matched to an occupation close to their own professional carrier; on the other hand, the 
vertical dimension indicates whether workers have the required level of skills or they are under or 
overcompetent (Heijke et al., 2003). In this paper, we are going to represent vertical mismatch with 
skills mismatch (as stated in section 2.3), differing from (Heijke et al., 2003) whose representation is 
only based on vocational competences. Meanwhile, the effect of educational mismatch will be 
represented with the ORU model (Duncan & Hoffman, 1981)  where attended education is 
discomposed into three parts:            , where    denotes attained education,    is the 
requirement amount of education,    is the amount of years of attained education above the job 
requirements, and    is the amount of years of attained education below job requirements. 
Given the definitions of types of skills and mismatch is important to clarify the theoretical 
interpretation of the relationship between this two set of variables. From the assignment model all 
type of skills have a positive relationship with the probability to find a match in two assignment 
dimensions, because workers with higher levels of human capital are going to have better 
productivity given the job requirements, so they can easily find better jobs in terms of matching. 
However (Heijke et al., 2003) proposed other type of interpretation, they concluded that generic 
abilities have a negative effect in the probability of working inside a worker’s educational domain 
(horizontal match), while vocational abilities have a positive relationship with this probability; this 
happens because a worker with higher level of generic competencies can deal with new problems in 
several fields, whereas higher vocational competencies are related to over-focusing in a particular 
field, making their knowledge and skills limited. 
  
4. Data 
The data used in this paper comes from the Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions 
2014 (encuesta de seguimiento a graduados 2014 de instituciones de educación superior) provided 
by the OLE. The survey was answered by 15,450 individuals graduated from higher education in 
technical, technological and university levels. Individuals are observed in three different cohorts: 
graduates one year before the survey, period between years 2012 and 2013.  The second cohort 
consists of graduates three years before survey, period between 2010 and 2011. Finally, the third 
cohort contains graduates five years before the survey, between years 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, 
graduates are divided into three groups depending on their occupational sector: employees, self-
employed and owners. We add the higher education graduates data base provided by the National 
Information System of Higher Education in Colombia (SNIES, by its acronym in Spanish) to include 
institutions and programs characteristics such as: code and name of the institution, sector and 
character, department and municipality of location of the institution, code and name of the program, 
level of education, methodology, area and basic core of knowledge, department and municipality 
where the program is offered. 
The Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions is divided in 6 parts. The part A contains 
information about personal and familiar situation of the graduates, including civil status, number of 
children and characteristics of housing payment. The part B contains information about graduate’s 
skills. The part C, talk about the plan of life and future plans, there is information about academic 
activities, business creation and job search. The part D has information about internal and external 
mobility, if the graduate has lived or studied abroad and if he is in the same city where he finished his 
higher education studies. The part E is the employment situation of graduate, which as we mentioned 
before, is divided into employees, self-employed and owners of farms, businesses or companies. Each 
group is asked about employment situation, compliance with the activity they are performing at the 
time of the survey and the industry which they currently belongs. Finally, the part F consists of 
questions about the level of identity of the graduate with the educational institution he belongs to. 
Since the objective of the research is to analyze the labor market and evaluate the congruence of 
education to meet the demand for workers, the sample is restricted to 9,615 graduates that are into the 
employees group, excluding of the study 3,266 graduates that are self-employed or owners. 
Within the module of work activities we have questions that can be used to build mismatch variables. 
To construct the horizontal mismatch indicator, we used the answer to the question about the 
perception of the relevance of careers studied on the tasks doing in the workplace. Horizontal 
mismatch is a dummy variable where one is nothing related (mismatch) and cero is direct and indirect 
related (match), approximately 8% of graduates reported having a job outside their own educational 
domain.  
The vertical mismatch variable (related to skills mismatch) is constructed using the answer to two 
question related with the possession of knowledge and skills. The first question asks about the job’s 
usefulness of knowledge and skills learned in his or her career, and the second question asks whether 
graduates believe they should be in another job to further develop their professional skills. Workers 
responding negatively to the first question (little helpful or unhelpful) are classified as 
undercompetent, workers answering affirmatively to the first question (useful or very useful) and 
negatively to the second question are classified as match in competence, and workers answering 
affirmatively to both questions are classified as overcompetent (Badillo-Amador et al., 2005). Within 
the employees group approximately 60% of graduates consider themselves overcompetent, 8% 
undercompetent and 32% matched in competence.    
In terms of educational mismatch, we use the question of level of study required in the actual job and 
compare it with the level of education attained by the graduate at the time of the survey; this way, we 
can get years of required education, years of overeducation and years of undereducation. 
Approximately 13% of the sample consider themself having years of overeducation, 34% having 
years of undereducation and 53% perceives themselves matched in education. In average, workers 
have 1.6 years of overeducation with a range between 1 and 7 years, meanwhile in terms of 
undereducation, workers have in average 2 years of undereducation with a range between 1 and 8 
years.  
It is important to take into account the types of measures of mismatch and the advantages and 
disadvantages of using one or the other. Hartog (2000) argues there are 3 classical ways to measure 
the mismatch: (1) Job analysis: systematic evaluation by professionals who specify the required level 
and type of education. For this process there is a lack of information in Colombia, precluding it´s use. 
(2) Worker self-assessment: workers responded a survey with mismatch information. This is a 
perception measure and can have problems related to the unobserved heterogeneity and inversed 
causality because salary could be affecting the perception. (3) Realized match: “required education is 
derived from what workers in the respondent’s job or occupation usually have attained, e.g. the mean 
or the mode of that distribution” (Hartog, 2000). This measure is far from covering the technological 
requirements of a job and it is an endogenous process. Considering the options, job analysis is 
conceptually superior but the measurement is not available, worker self-assessment is therefore the 
best available alternative. Given the above and the characteristics of our survey this article is going to 
work with worker self-assessment measures, considering that it is the best method to which we can 
access and also accepting the problems we may face. 
The part B of the survey contains questions related with the individual’s skills, in the first part there is 
variables with the level of reading, writing and listening of 8 different languages
4
. In the second part 
there are 26 variables measuring the individual satisfaction with respect to a specific competence at 
the time of graduation. We use the multivariate technique of exploratory factor analysis to reduce the 
dimensionality of data regarding underlying structure caused by latent variables (See Appendix 1). 
We find 2 significant latent constructs that explain the 95% of the total variance.  We used as a 
theoretical framework to lumping together the variables the articles by Ananiadou & Claro (2008) 
and Beneitone et al. (2007). The outcome of the latter show a first factor called “interpersonal 
dimension” explaining the information related to effective communication, solve problems and social 
impact, the second factors is called “information dimension” which explains how graduates analyze 
information and how they dominate the use of technological tools. Henceforth, interpersonal 
dimension will be understood as generic abilities and information dimension as specific abilities. 
Much of the individual heterogeneity comes from unobservable characteristics as individuals abilities 
or intelligence (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006). To control the effect of these unobservable 
variables we take additional abilities information comes from the standardized test SABER-11
5
 and 
SABER-PRO
6
 with which we can approximate individuals’ abilities, following Carneiro, Hansen, & 
Heckman (2003) and Neumann, Olitsky, & Robbins (2009). Data about test scores is reported by 
ICFES (Instituto Colombiano para la Evaluación de la Educación); with data available from year 
2007 to year 2014. Using exploratory factor analysis to SABER-11 and SABER-PRO we find one 
factor to each test representing individual’s abilities before and after higher education. Since the 
Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions is anonymized
7
 we cannot add directly the data 
base with the estimated individual abilities, thus using hierarchical models we impute the individual 
ability to the Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions 2014 data base (See appendix 2). 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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Additionally, as mentioned before, we will test which model fit better to the Colombian situation, this 
paper uses a statistical approach used by Badillo-Amador et al. (2005) compares the marginal 
distribution of the two types of mismatch (education and skills) and estimates the degree of statistical 
association between them. To build up the empirical joint distribution function we assume that a 
worker can be simultaneously classified, for instance, as matched in skills and mismatch in education 
or mismatched in skills and matched in education, or any other possible combination. Table 2 shows 
the empirical joint distribution function (see the data section), marginally it is worth noting that 
educational and skills mismatch are quite different, for example, only 8% of the sample are classified 
as undercompetent whereas 34% are undereducated and at the same time barely 14% are overeducate 
while 60% are overcompetent. Apparently these measures are explaining phenomena of different 
nature; formal statistical tests of association strongly suggest that this suspicion is correct. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Horizontal Mismatch 0.07 0.26 0 1.0
Overcompetent 0.61 0.49 0 1.0
Undercompetent 0.08 0.26 0 1.0
Required education 15.29 1.76 9 21.0
Overeducated 2.49 1.39 1 7.0
Undereducated 2.03 1.02 1 8.0
Years of experience 2.63 1.74 0 5.0
Years of experience^2 9.95 9.59 0 25.0
Physical limitations 0.10 0.29 0 1.0
Number of languages 0.57 0.66 0 7.0
studied abroad 0.03 0.17 0 1.0
Individuals’ abilities 5.66 0.26 5 7.1
Individuals’ abilities after college 1.96 3.00 0 8.3
Interpersonal dimension 8.23 1.20 0 10.0
Information dimension 7.55 1.43 0 10.0
Rented housing 0.47 0.50 0 1.0
Single 0.67 0.47 0 1.0
Number of children 0.32 0.47 0 1.0
You used social networks to get the current job 0.54 0.50 0 1.0
IES accredited 0.22 0.41 0 1.0
Agronomy and related 0.04 0.19 0 1.0
Arts and humanities 0.09 0.29 0 1.0
Educational science 0.08 0.27 0 1.0
Health 0.13 0.34 0 1.0
Social sciences 0.11 0.32 0 1.0
Economy and business 0.21 0.41 0 1.0
Engineering 0.26 0.44 0 1.0
Mathematics and Natural Sciences 0.04 0.20 0 1.0
Cohort 1 0.36 0.48 0 1.0
Cohort 2 0.33 0.47 0 1.0
Cohort 3 0.31 0.46 0 1.0
Own elaboration with data  from the OLE
Table 1
  
It is also important to note that a relatively high proportion of people are simultaneously classified as 
undereducated and overcompetent (19%) and as undereducated having the competences required for 
their job (13%). We might be tempting to say that firms in the Colombian labor market have higher 
job requirements than they should have (in terms of level of education), because workers with less 
education than required have skills and knowledge enough (or even more) to perform adequately 
their tasks. 
From the above we can conclude that for our sample, heterogeneous skills theory has a greater 
explanatory power since statistically, education and skills mismatch are independent processes so we 
cannot use education match as a proxy for competence match in the labor market as also found Di 
Pietro & Urwin (2003), Badillo-Amador et al. (2005) and Green & McIntosh (2007), it is important 
to the empirical approach and conclusions. 
 
5. Empirical Model 
The objective of the empirical approach is to evaluate the theoretical hypothesis provided by the 
assignment model which postulates that the most suitable individuals for every job will receive a 
wage  compensation  and  the  wage  differentials  will  reflect differences  in productivity. We try to 
measure the impact of horizontal and vertical mismatch in wages, if we use a simple OLS regression 
controlling for individuals characteristics we cannot deal with the selection and inverse causality 
problems (as mentioned before). The problem is that the fact of belonging to the group of workers 
matched is a process determined by both graduates’ observed and unobserved abilities (Goux & 
Maurin, 2000) additionally the perception of mismatch can be influenced by salary.  
Since the exogeneity of the assignment process cannot be guaranteed (even controlling for 
observables) we propose the method developed by (Heckman, 1974, 1979) and (Lee, 1978) based on 
two basic assumptions. First, it acknowledges the existence of latent variables underlying the decision 
making process and allowing us to model individual choices. Second, it assumes that the choices are 
function of a vector of co-variables that affect the fact that the individual is matched but not his 
salary. 
We suggest the following model based on (Heijke et al., 2003). Let      a Dummy variable which 
represents the horizontal mismatch: the individual   is assigned to a work   not related to his field of 
studies. The vertical mismatch will be measured with two Dummy variables representing the 
Overcompetent Undercompetent Match in competence Educational Match
Overeducated 9.59 2.92 1.53 14.04
Undereducated 18.82 2.21 13.08 34.1
Match in education 31.15 2.82 17.89 51.86
Competence Match 59.56 7.95 32.49 100
Competence vs. Education mismatch
Table 2
Own elaboration with data from the OLE
individual misallocation of abilities, one for overcompetent and one for undercompetent.      is a 
variable that indicates the graduate   is overqualified for the job   and      indicates the individual   
is underqualified for the job  . It also defines       as the wage logarithm of individual   for the 
job  . We consider the following model of simultaneous equations: 
    
             
                  
                
                 
    
             
                  
                
                
    
                           
                 
               
                
                                      
Where    ,     and    are independent variable vectors that affect the vertical and horizontal 
mismatches respectively do not necessarily have to be different. It is important to note that the 
correlation between the two types of mismatch is allowed, since it is possible to think that the fact 
that a person has skills different to those required for his job would affect his probability of being 
outside of his vocational domain.   ,    and    identify the impact of the misallocation in the wages, 
and are the parameters of interest.  
The model is called the two-step treatment effect method; it starts by estimating the process of 
mismatch using the multivariate probit model. Then, the inverse Mills ratio are built using the results 
of the probit models for each estimation (     referred to the model for horizontal mismatch 
model,    referred to overcompetent and    referred to undercompetent) and they are used as 
independent variables to control for selection. If the coefficient of any inverse Mills ratio is equal to 
zero there are no bias issues in the estimation of the effect of the variable that generates it, whereas if 
the effect is positive and significant, there are non-observable factors that positively influence the 
probability of the occurrence of the event (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). 
The second assumption mentioned, which guarantees the identification of parameters, is that there are 
variables that are supposed to be correlated with the assignment process but not with the non-
observable determinants of the wage. We used the same exogenous variable vector for the estimation 
of the three processes of misallocations. First, we took into account the personal situation of the 
individual as a proxy for his financial urgency to find a job. The number of children, rent housing, 
and being married can be a pressure for the graduate to find a job quickly making it possible that he 
gets a job not suitable for his characteristics. Second, following the argument used by  (Heijke et al., 
2003) we used the interpersonal abilities (interpersonal dimension) related with the generic skills and 
the abilities of the information related with technical or specific skills, reported by the individuals at 
the moment of their graduation. The assumption to use these variables is that the level of skills of the 
graduates increases with experience and training during their years in labor market, besides it is 
expected that this raise differs between graduates, which means there is no expectation of correlation 
between this latent constructs and non-observables variables of wage. It’s important to note that the 
differences between the increments of skills among individuals can happen because of their initial 
skills; therefore the general intelligence would mostly explain the changes of the wages. This variable 
is included as control in the wage equation (the variable is measured by the Saber 11 and Saber Pro 
tests). According to the latter, the interpersonal and information dimensions in their initial levels 
affect only the assignment process.  
The table 3 shows the results of the trivariate probit. First, by analyzing the horizontal mismatch, we 
can see the importance of all the other mismatch measures by explaining the probability of an 
individual being outside his educational domain. The vertical mismatch variables and the education 
mismatch have a positive effects in the probability of the field of studies not being related with the 
individual work field, it is interesting to note that not only the undercompetent and undereducated 
increase the probability of vertical mismatch, but also the overcompetent and overeducated, which 
indicates that the direction of the mismatch is not what is important, but the mismatch in itself. The 
interpersonal and information skills dimensions also have a significant effect in this part of the 
assignment process. The latent construct referred to the generic skills such as effective 
communication, problem solving and social impact raises the probability of having a horizontal 
mismatch; the construct referred to technical skills or specific abilities such as technological tools 
decreases the probability of being outside the educational domain. These results confirm the 
hypothesis that the specific knowledge focuses the skills in a particular field, making it more likely to 
find a job in that area, while a more general knowledge allows the individual to deal with problems in 
different fields, making him more likely to find jobs in different areas outside of his vocational 
domain. 
 Independent Variables Coefficient S.E.
Overcompetent 0.173 ** 0.067
Undercompetent 1.239 *** 0.113
Interpersonal Dimension 0.114 ** 0.056
information Dimension -0.181 *** 0.049
Single -0.064 0.051
Number of Children -0.058 0.052
Rent Housing -0.085 ** 0.042
Required Education -0.217 *** 0.020
Overeducation 0.027 0.023
Undereducation 0.126 *** 0.024
Years of Experience -0.158 *** 0.043
Years of Experience^2 0.017 ** 0.008
Number of Languages 0.024 0.033
Lived Abroad 0.044 0.131
studied abroad -0.020 0.183
Individuals’ abilities -0.122 *** 0.034
Individuals’ abilities after college 0.076 0.057
Accredited University 0.000 0.124
Intercept 2.068 *** 0.366
Dependent Variable: Overcompetent
Interpersonal Dimension -0.004 0.034
information Dimension 0.078 *** 0.029
Single 0.048 * 0.030
Number of Children 0.029 0.031
Rent Housing -0.011 0.024
Required Education -0.040 *** 0.013
Overeducation -0.008 0.017
Undereducation -0.044 *** 0.013
Years of Experience 0.001 0.027
Years of Experience^2 -0.003 0.005
Number of Languages -0.030 0.019
Lived Abroad -0.079 0.075
studied abroad 0.017 0.098
Individuals’ abilities -0.012 0.018
Individuals’ abilities after college -0.093 *** 0.027
Accredited University 0.002 0.058
Intercept 0.727 ** 0.230
Table 3
Trivariate Probit Analysis
Dependent Variable: Horizontal Mismatch
Vertical Mismatch
Competencies
  
Noting the initial individual skills (measured as a general intelligence latent construct), it seems we 
can confirm the result of the assignment model according to which the more competent individuals 
have better opportunities to have a successful match, since that variable reduces the probability of an 
individual being horizontally mismatched. It is to be expected, according to the results of the 
searching model, that the years of experience decrease (seemingly exponentially during the first few 
years in the labor market) the probability of being vertically mismatched. The graduates from Health 
sciences, mathematics and natural sciences have, respectively, a bigger probability of finding an 
occupation in those areas.  
The skills involved in being overcompetent show similar results to the horizontal mismatch, 
individuals with higher generic skills increase the probability of being overcompetent for their job. 
Meanwhile, both, generic and specific skills significantly reduce the probability of being 
undercompetent for the job. Having the required education for a job reduces both, the probability of 
being overcompetent and undercompetent. The undereducation affects the probability of being 
overcompetent in a negative way, which has a practical sense because it’s presumable that people 
with fewer studies than those required will not declare that their skills are above those required. The 
Independent Variables Coefficient S.E.
Dependent Variable: Undercompetent
Interpersonal Dimension -0.176 *** 0.046
information Dimension -0.196 *** 0.041
Single 0.004 0.045
Number of Children -0.091 ** 0.045
Rent Housing -0.032 0.035
Required Education -0.097 *** 0.018
Overeducation 0.070 *** 0.022
Undereducation 0.069 *** 0.020
Years of Experience -0.080 ** 0.038
Years of Experience^2 0.010 0.007
Number of Languages 0.081 ** 0.027
Lived Abroad 0.118 0.105
studied abroad 0.021 0.135
Individuals’ abilities 0.008 0.027
Individuals’ abilities after college 0.026 0.042
Accredited University -0.161 * 0.091
Intercept 1.693 *** 0.314
Correlation (missalocation and overcompetent) 0.017 0.031
Correlation (missalocation and undercompetent) -0.035 0.051
Correlation (overcompetent and undercompetent) -0.800 *** 0.009
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level.
Table 3 (continued )
The estimation also include dummies for employees own account, owners and 
academic areas.
overeducartion, on the other hand, has no effect, which still suggests the success of using the 
heterogeneous skills theory to understand the results. Any form of educational misallocation 
increases the probability of an individual being undercompetent for a job, the relationship between 
undereducation and being undercompetent is evident; the relationship between overeducation and 
being undercompetent, not so much. This might have something to do with what we mention before 
when we talked about the difference between assignment models and heterogeneous skills models. 
That is: an individual who is apparently overeducated can appear to be so because he is in the lower 
tail of the skills distribution in a specific academic level, which would increase the probability to 
have fewer skills than those required for a job.  As in the case of horizontal mismatch, in both over 
and undercompetences, the years of experience reduce (in this case, linearly) the probability of 
having a vertical mismatch. In the knowledge areas, Health sciences and Arts and humanities are the 
ones that mostly decrease the probability of being overcompetent. Both, Health and Education 
sciences are also involved in the decrease of the probability of being undercompetent.   
5.1. Mismatches’ effects on wages 
After the estimation of the selection process for the mismatch variables we proceed with the 
consistent estimation of the wage equation. The results can be seen in table 4. These results include 
the effect treatment procedure in two stages, which guarantees the identification of coefficients. The 
results of this regression show that the effects of the horizontal and vertical mismatches are negative 
and significant; this validates the prediction of the assignment model in which, for the wage function 
that ensures the market equilibrium, the more competent individuals for each job (those well 
matched) receive a wage premium due to the existence of comparative advantages. There’s evidence 
in favor of the assignment models (Hartog, 1981, 1986a, 1986b, 2000; Heijke et al., 2003; Neumann 
et al., 2009; Sattinger, 1975, 1993) regarding that the wage is determined not only by individual 
characteristics but also by job characteristics. 
About the educational mismatch, when using OLS (see table 5), we came up with the usual results 
that can also be found in the literature (Dolton & Vignoles, 2000; Duncan & Hoffman, 1981; Hartog, 
2000; Korpi & Tåhlin, 2009), the coefficients related to the required education and the overeducation 
are positive and the coefficient of the undereducation is negative. Also, the coefficient of the required 
education is higher than the overeducation coefficient, which means that a worker over educated 
earns more than a worker in that same position, but properly matched, but less than another worker 
properly matched with his same level of education. When using the two-step treatment effect method 
the coefficient of the required education decreases quantitatively, which means there are non-
observable factors that affect that variable. This keeps the qualitative conclusions, but not the 
quantitative ones.   
The comparison between OLS and the model that corrects endogeneity can be seen in table 5. It 
shows that there are no significant changes in the estimated coefficient in the case of the horizontal 
mismatch, which can be explained by the lack of statistical significance of the inverse Mills ratio that 
comes from the selection model of this variable. As mentioned before, this implies that the bias does 
not seem to be a problem in the estimation of the effect of this variable. 
  
 
 
On the contrary, the vertical mismatch coefficients had significant reductions (the undercompetent 
mismatch became non-significant), which can be explained by the positive and significant value of 
the inverse Mills ratio estimated by these two selection processes. These variables have a positive 
bias and the estimated values for the two-stage correction method have to be lower in absolute values, 
as the results are showing. Though it seems that the estimation method is solving the bias in the 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E.
Horizontal Mismatch -0.095 *** 0.024
Overcompetent -0.118 *** 0.018
Undercompetent -0.011 0.084
Required Education 0.077 *** 0.022
Overeducation 0.110 *** 0.008
Undereducation -0.085 *** 0.009
Years of Experience 0.052 *** 0.016
Years of Experience^2 0.000 0.002
Number of Languages 0.005 0.009
Lived Abroad 0.003 0.040
studied abroad 0.070 0.050
Individuals’ abilities 0.048 *** 0.012
Individuals’ abilities after college -0.027 0.020
Accredited University -0.071 ** 0.028
λ1 (Horizontal Mismatch) 0.097 0.083
λ2 (Overcompetent) 1.355 *** 0.320
λ3 (Undercompetent) 0.333 *** 0.052
Intercept 11.364 *** 0.123
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level.
The estimation also include dummies for employees own account, 
owners and academic areas.
The wage equation
Table 4
Variable
Horizontal Mismatch -0.092 -0.095
(0.024) (0.024)
Overcompetent -0.137 -0.118
(0.012) (0.018)
Undercompetent -0.121 -0.011
(0.024) (0.084)
Two-step treatment effectOLS
Comparison Between Methods
Table 5
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***
***
***
***
estimation of the parameters, this methodology still has two issues. First, it assumes that the terms of 
error of the equations are jointly distributed; and second (and more important) the validity of the 
instruments (   ,     y   ), because if they were not correct, the estimations would be unstable and 
the parameters unreliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The  pertinence  in  education  understood  as  the  mismatch  between  individual  skills  and  job  
characteristics, to the Colombian case confirms the economic theory postulated by the assignment  
model  (Roy, 1951; Sattinger, 1975, 1993) where  there  is  a  wage  penalty  for  mismatched 
individuals. Then we can think this is a relevant topic for public policy within the country because it 
has real effects on social welfare such as better wages, better productivity and better life quality due 
to working in a job that matches his career. The results of this article are important because they 
allow establishing knowledge fields and institutions for higher education that are doing things better 
in terms of pertinence.  
We  included  three  types  of  abilities:  first,  the  competences  extracted  from  saber  11  that  are 
important in the empirical model to control for initial abilities. Differences in initial abilities may 
generate unobserved heterogeneity. Second, competences taken from Saber Pro used to measure the 
specific  abilities  and  finally  the  Survey  of  Graduates  of  Higher  Education  Institutions  2014  to 
measure  generic  abilities.  Abilities  variables  created  using  these  data  sets,  allowed  us  a  better 
understanding  of  the  assignment  process  and  it  made  easier  to  establish  relationships  between 
human capital  and  the  probability  of  being  matched  in  the  labor  market.  Mainly,  we  found  
that generic abilities raise the probability of horizontal mismatch and diminish the probability of 
vertical mismatch,  while  information  competencies  lower  the  probability  of  both  horizontal  and  
vertical mismatch.  
Although this methodology has certain important advantages dealing with the endogenity problem, 
the  results  found  should  be  look  cautiously  due  to  two  disadvantages:  the  assumption  of  the 
normality  of  the  errors  and  the  validity  of  the  instruments.  New data sets are is planned to be 
included in the analysis to measure the mismatch variables trying to create a more objective indicator, 
whit the objective to use systematic evaluation by professionals who specify the required level and 
type of education. It is important to have into account these issues for further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Factor analysis to abilities 
In this section we seek to adapt the skills variables for the Survey of Graduates of Higher Education 
Institutions 2014 data base for a multivariate statistical analysis with the aim to regard underlying 
structure caused by latent variables which also allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the data. We 
use 26 variables measuring the individual satisfaction with respect to a specific competence at the 
time of graduation, skills measures are: 
 
 
 
Individuals using a rating scale of 1-4, with 1 being very unsatisfied, 2 unsatisfied, 3 satisfied and 4 
very satisfied. (Olsson, 1979a) argument that common approximation when ordinal scale variables 
are analyzed is assign an integer value to each category and proceed with the analysis as if the data 
were measured on an interval scale with desirable distributional properties, proceed with this 
assumption can lead to erroneous results statistically. Specifically (Olsson, 1979b) shows that  when 
factor analysis are performed with discrete data the conclusion of number of factors is wrong and the 
estimation of factor loadings is imprecise, mostly due to biased estimates of correlation. 
Competences measures
Present ideas for written media
Clearly communicate orally
Persuade and convince
Communication Symbols
Multicultural differences
Use basic computer tools
Learn and stay updated
Be creative and innovative
Search, analyze, manage and share information
Create, investigate and adopt technology
Design and implement solutions supported by technology
Identify, formulate and solve problems
Capacity for abstraction, analysis and synthesis
Understand the reality that surrounds it
Taking culture of coexistence
Take responsibility and make decisions
Plan and use time effectively to achieve the objectives
Using specialized computer tools
Develop and implement projects
Work together to achieve common goals
Work independently without constant supervision
Apply professional values and ethics in work performance
Adapt to changes
Working under pressure
Being able to take risks
Identify opportunities and resources in the environment
Own elaboration with data  from the OLE
(Kolenikov & Angeles, 2004) argue that the most common way of dealing with discrete variables is 
to assume that come from a continuous variable underlying   
 . If observed variables are divided in 
      categories, it is assumed to be obtained by dividing the continuous variable (   
 ) according to 
a set of thresholds            , where                    
      . To obtain unbiased 
estimates of correlation between two categorical variables    and    the correlation of the underlying 
continuous variables   
  and   
  should be found. This type of estimation is called polychorical 
correlation (Olsson, 1979a) and is a generalization of tetrachorical correlation to variables with more 
than two election options (Pearson, 1904). 
We use the polychorical correlation matrix to perform the exploratory factor analysis. First we 
conduct tests to verify tests to verify the strength of the relationship and the existence of linear 
relationships in the correlation matrix; results are summarized in the following table. The determinant 
of the correlation matrix is very close to zero indicating that the matrix might not be full range. To 
assess whether the determinant of the matrix is statistically different from zero Bartlett test of 
sphericity is used, the null hypothesis is that the observed correlation matrix is equal to the identity 
matrix, suggesting that the observed matrix is factorable. There is statistical evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis confirming that there are linear combinations in the matrix. Proficiency Test sampling 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin is a measure of share variance, closer to one, there is more shared variance. The 
KMO value is 0.968 presents evidence of the high degree of common variance in the group of 
selected variables so it is appropriate to use multivariate factor analysis. 
 
We perform an exploratory factor analysis using the iterated principal factor method, following the 
rule of Kaiser we retain the first two components whose eigenvalues are above one and explain about 
95% of the variance. The eigenvectors include the correlations of factors and original variables, and 
serve to interpret the dimension to which each factor belongs. Following (Beavers et al., 2013) and 
(Fabrigar et al., 1999) we use an oblique rotation to interpret the results and because in social 
sciences oblique rotation is indicated by allowing the correlation between factors. We present the 
results of the 2 factors selected, only correlation coefficients greater than 0.3 are included since these 
values are considered significant (Schönrock-Adema, Heijne-Penninga, Van Hell, & Cohen-
Schotanus, 2009). 
Measurement Value
Determinant of the correlation matrix 0.000
Bartlett test of sphericity 0.000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.968
Own elaboration with data  from the OLE
  
The first factor explains variables of communication, problem solving and social impact, taking latter 
dimension higher correlation levels. We interpret this factor based on (Beneitone et al., 2007) where 
the group of interpersonal skills  possesses all the competences explained by the first latent construct 
(decision-making skills, interpersonal skills, ability to motivate and work towards common goals, 
capacity for teamwork, ability to organize and plan time, ability to act in new situations, creativity, 
ability to work autonomously, capacity for formulate and manage projects, commitment to quality). 
Meanwhile the second factor relates more clearly to the analysis of information and mastery of 
technological tools, based on (Ananiadou & Claro, 2008) the information dimension is related to 
information as a source (search, selection, evaluation and organization of information) and 
information as a product (Restructuring and modeling of information and the development of ideas). 
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 The values of estimated factors may be positive or negative, which make difficult their interpretation 
(Krishnan, 2010). Thus, we re-scale the factors to be measured from 0 to 10. The values of the factors 
measure the graduate’s perception regarding the interpersonal and information dimension relative to 
the perception of other graduates, it means, the factors only provide relative measures, we cannot 
extract absolute information of individual´s abilities. 
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Appendix 2: Estimating individuals’ skills using “Saber 11” and “Saber Pro” test scores 
With the aim to find a good prediction of individual abilities, we are going to use a hierarchical 
model of test performance as a function of student-level, program-level, college-level and 
municipality-level characteristics.  
The hierarchical structure with a random-intercept is as follows: 
(1) 
First level (student):                                           
Second level (program):                           
Third level (institution)                                            
Fourth level (municipality):                      
Where       is a measure of test performance for individual   nested in program  , in the institution   
in the municipality  .       is the average outcome,        is the individual educational level and       
is an individual-level error. To the other levels the formulation is analogous.     and    are 
institutions characteristics, first is referred to the institution’s sector:  public or private, and second 
indicates weather the institution is high quality certified or not. The errors are not independent so is 
necessary to estimate a random model (Hofmann, 1985). 
The objective of       is to act as a measure of individual abilities before and after higher education. 
In that sense performed a factor analysis to find the latent variables that account for the patterns of 
the process. The analysis was based on mathematics, language, philosophy, biology, chemistry and 
physics tests in the case of SABER-11. In the case of SABER-PRO we included the results of written 
communication, English, quantitative reasoning, critical reading and citizenship skills. We found one 
factor in each case that explained the 97% and 98% of the total variance of the results of SABER-11 
and SABER-PRO respectively. The factors in each case have positive correlation with the results of 
all components, whereby we can interpret the each factor as individual abilities measured by the tests. 
As in the previous case, the estimated factors were re-scaled in a measure from 0 to 10. 
The results using both methods are in the following table. All variables using as a fixed effects to 
both measures of abilities are significant and have the expected correlation sign to the dependent 
variable in the four models. We estimate 4 models including and extracting random effects of 
program, institution and municipality. The model that includes only effects of program and 
municipality is the best fit following AIC and BIC criteria. The average test score for the population 
was 5.44 and 6.96 to SABER-11 and SABER-PRO respectably, reflected in the constant term. To the 
SABER-11 case, the result of random effects, program and municipality, was 0.86 and 1.53 
respectably. The explained variance was attributable, approximately, in a 20% to the program effects, 
while 36% was attributable to the municipality effects. To the SABER-PRO case the values for 
program and municipality was 0.89 and 0.12 respectively and in terms of explained variance 25% 
was attributable to program effects and 3.6% to municipality effects. 
 The model fit well the data so we use previous estimations to predict latent abilities of individuals in 
the Survey of Graduates of Higher Education Institutions 2014 data base. We use the coefficients of 
the best model and predicted random intercept for each level. With of equations (1) we estimate the 
individual’s abilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test
5.444 6.961
(0.017) 0.007
0.027
(0.010)
0.036
(0.006)
0.322 0.539
(0.012) (0.013)
0.865 0.890
(0.032) (0.026)
0.000
(0.000)
1.535 0.128
(0.014) (0.006)
1.797 2.515
(0.004) 0.008)
standard deviation in parentheses
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
***
Constant
Educational level
Sector
Acreditation
Residual variation
Program
Institution
Municipality
SABER-11
Fixed effects
Random effects
SABER-PRO
***
***
***
***
**
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